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   ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a social  insurance system that  integrates unemployment 
insurance with a pension program through an individual account,  al lowing 
workers to borrow against their  future wage income to f inance consumption 
during an unemployment episode and thus improving their  search incentives 
while reducing risks.  This paper identif ies factors  which determine the optimal 
degree of integration. A fully integrated system is one in which no rel iance is  
placed at  al l  on a separate tax-funded unemployment insurance program.  We 
show that  when the   duration of unemployment is  very short  compared to the 
period of employment or ret irement,  the optimal system involves an exclusive 
rel iance on pension-funded self- insurance.   This system imposes a negligible 
r isk burden for workers while avoiding at tenuating  search incentives.  We also 
argue that  a joint  integration of several  social  insurance programs with a 
pension program through an individual  account is  desirable unless the  r isks are 






The East Asian crisis brought home to much of the developing world a lesson that the 
Great Depression brought home to more advanced countries seventy years ago—the 
importance of a safety net.  But as countries like Korea go about constructing their safety 
nets, they are cognizant of the complaints that have been raised against unemployment 
insurance systems: they attenuate incentives.  To be sure, there are adverse incentive 
effects (or, as they are today generally referred to, moral hazard effects) in all insurance 
programs.  What worries critics is that the risk reduction benefits might, on the face of it,  
be outweighed by the adverse incentive effects.  For most  individuals, a typical spell of 
unemployment is less than six months (and that spell would  presumably be shorter, 
possibly much shorter in the absence of unemployment insurance.) Over a working time 
of, say, forty-five years, an individual with three such spells would lose perhaps 4% of 
his lifetime income—a risk which presumably the individual could easily absorb  if he 
had sufficient savings or could borrow against future earnings.  With the bulk of savings  
used for retirement, and mostly dedicated to social security programs, the amount 
individuals have to buffer themselves against these income shocks is limited; and well 
documented  limitations in capital markets make it difficult for individuals to borrow 
much against future earnings. Thus compulsory old age public pension programs, while 
they help resolve one problem—the tendency of individuals not to save enough for their 
old age, because of the proclivity of public “bail-outs”—exacerbate another. 
  This naturally leads to the suggestion of an integrated unemployment and pension 




integration makes particular sense with  individual accounts, which are increasingly 
forming the basis of even public pension programs.1 In such programs, benefits are 
related to contributions by simple formulae; in the simplest form, there is no 
redistribution. Such programs are like defined contribution pension programs, though 
some of the contributions can be used to “purchase” insurance (e.g. against inflation or 
interest rate fluctuations) which is not available on the market.  But it is easy to impose 
redistributions on top.  For simplicity, in this paper, we will ignore the redistributive 
components.2 
Under the integrated  UI system through an individual account, an individual who is 
unemployed can have his unemployment payments taken out of his individual account. 
Thus, the individual obtains the liquidity to maintain his standard of living; the 
compulsory and universal nature of the contributions provide, in effect, perfect collateral, 
so that  early on in his life, his account balance could become negative. The fact that 
normally the risk is small means that the individual can bear this risk—when it is spread 
out over his entire life; and since the individual bears the risk, there is no attenuation of 
job search incentives.  
If, however, the loss from unemployment is large enough, it is optimal to have some 
true unemployment insurance—the individual should not bear the cost even over his 
lifetime.  In general, individuals should not rely exclusively on the pension-funded self-
insurance under the integrated UI system. In this paper we take this ‘lifetime’ 
unemployment insurance to be tax-funded, but the results would be identical with a 
mandatory private insurance program with competitively determined premia.3 Taking this 




UI system, that is, the optimal combination of the two types of benefits—tax-funded and 
pension-funded. The lower the risk-aversion, or the greater the elasticity of search with 
respect to the insurance benefit, the less reliance should be placed on tax-funded 
insurance as opposed to (what might be viewed as implicit) pension-funded self-
insurance. In an extreme case, if a worker is risk-neutral, then there should be no need for 
tax-funded unemployment insurance, and if there is no incentive problem associated with 
unemployment insurance, there is no need to rely on pension-funded self-insurance. Not 
surprisingly, the larger the risk, which in turn is related to the length of the period of 
unemployment relative to the working period, the greater the need for tax-funded 
insurance.  In the limit, if the period of unemployment is vanishingly minute, then the 
individual can bear all the risk through pension-funded self-insurance with no welfare 
loss. 
   Unemployment is, of course, only one of many risks that individuals face.  There are, 
for instance, the risks of disability and health, as well as unemployment.  The idea of 
integration can  be applied to each of these risks, leading us to consider what we call an 
integrated lifetime insurance program. Under the integrated lifetime insurance  pension 
savings can be used to provide cover for these risks.  The Provident Funds of Malaysia 
and Singapore provide prototypes of such an integrated program.   The problem is that 
while the loss from any one of these risks may be small, there is some chance the 
individual may experience all of these losses.  In that case, the funds  available to an 
individual at the time of retirement  may be reduced to an unacceptably low level .If the 
government has to provide lifetime insurance to cover such contingencies—in  effect, 




pension, the borrowing by an individual to smooth consumption to cover any one of these 
risks would have an adverse disincentive effect much as the tax-funded benefit does. 
These considerations might appear to diminish the relevance of  joint integration.   
  We argue in this paper, however, that so long as the risks are not perfectly correlated 
then it always pays to integrate all the social insurance programs with the pension 
program rather than to have separate insurance programs covering each risk. The key 
point is that the integrated lifetime insurance system allows a given amount of pension 
savings of an individual to be used for the benefits under all the risks. This benefit of 
joint integration—having a common pool from which to draw upon—gets larger as the 
correlation gets smaller. 
 In the next section we present a basic model for an integrated UI system to 
characterize its optimal benefit structure and to show how it varies with the relative size 
of unemployment risk and other parameters. Section 3 provides an informal presentation 
for an integrated lifetime insurance system to argue for its optimality. Some concluding 
remarks are given in Section 4. 
 
 
II. The Model 
Consider an infinitely-lived worker who spends (M+2) periods working and retires for 
the remaining N periods, as depicted in Figure 0.  In period 2 a worker becomes 
unemployed with probability q. The length of unemployment depends upon his search 
decision. In this paper we assume that a worker can choose either ‘no search’ or ‘search’.  




not search, he remains unemployed for one period. Thus, depending upon his search 
decision, a worker with an unemployment shock can either be employed or unemployed 
in period 2. The cost of search e is a random variable, which is distributed with 
distribution function F(e). There is a threshold search cost e′, such that he chooses to 
search (or not to search) if e < (or >) e′.  Thus the probability of being unemployed in 
period 2 is q(1-F(e′)). 
 Suppose there is a public pension program,4 to which an individual worker is mandated 
to contribute a certain portion of his income. Although it does not matter whether the 
pension program is of a defined-contribution  or of a defined-benefit type, here we will 
assume for simplicity that an individual’s pension is determined simply by his 
contributions.  In addition to mandatory savings, an individual may also have voluntary 
private savings for retirement or to cover the risk of unemployment  in the future.  
Under the integrated UI system, the unemployment benefit comes from two sources: 
from a formal unemployment program, funded by an unemployment insurance tax, and 
from the past and prospective mandated pension savings.  If the period of unemployment 
is small enough and/or the mandated level of savings is high enough, and if the individual 
is allowed to borrow as much as he wants from his individual account, there would be no 
additional precautionary savings to cover the risk of unemployment. . In other words, an 
individual would save just for retirement.  
The main objective of the integrated UI system is to provide efficient consumption 
smoothing and lifetime risk absorption, while minimizing the adverse search incentives.   
We approach the problem in several stages.  We first pretend the government could 




whether the individual does or does not face an unemployment shock) as well as search 
(which will presumably depend on the cost of search e) to characterize the first-best 
optimum.   We then analyze the constrained optimum, where the government cannot 
directly control whether individuals search the government knows however, that their 
search decisions will depend on the benefits provided.  We next characterize a set of 
unemployment insurance tax and benefits as well as mandated savings and retirement 
benefits the government needs to achieve this constrained optimum, examining, in 
particular the factors that determine the optimal degree of integration. In doing this we 
will assume for the expositional simplicity that there is no discounting for money and 
utility. This will enable us to identify more clearly the welfare gains associated with the 
integrated UI system. 
 Let  1C  be the consumption in period 1 for an individual. From period 2 on, there are 
two different work-states possible for an individual: ‘unemployed in period 2’ (U) and 
‘employed in period 2’ (N). A worker with one work-state chooses his consumption 
pattern over time differently from the one with the other work-state. 
Let tutn CC ,, ,  (for t >1) be the amount of consumption at time t for an individual with 
work-state N, U, respectively. Then, assuming that consumption C and search effort e  
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The above constraint indicates that the sum of the expected consumption over a lifetime 
should be equal to the expected lifetime wage income earned.  This can also be 
interpreted as an aggregate constraint based upon the law of large numbers. 
 
First Best Solution 
Maximizing the expected utility function V subject to the above constraint, with 
respect to consumption at each date and in work state }ˆ,ˆ,{ ,,1 tutn CCC  and with respect to 
the threshold search cost eˆ , we have 
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for all t (>1)—there is complete consumption smoothing - and 
 





where ))ˆ(1(ˆ eFqq −≡ . In our model, search always yields a job, which generates a wage 
of w and a marginal utility of U’w; it pays to search so long as the cost of search (in 
utility terms) is less than the cost.   
  The first-best expected utility Vˆ  of an individual would then be  
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Second best optimum 
In fact, however, the government cannot directly control individual search behavior. If 
the government guaranteed consumption irrespective of search, no individual would have 
an incentive to search.  The threshold search cost e′ chosen by an individual worker will 
be the one that maximizes his expected utility V without taking into account its effect 
upon the constraint (2). Thus, we have 
 














tutn CUCUe .                                (3) 
 
The optimal outcome that the government can achieve given its inability to control 
individual search behavior, otherwise called the second-best optimum, can be 
characterized by maximizing the expected utility V(.) subject to the constraint (2) and the 
individual search behavior constraint (3).  A detailed analysis of the second-best optimum 




system is characterized. But one can see that the additional constraint (3) implies that the 




1 tutn CCC  and threshold search cost 
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for all t = 2, --, M+N+2,  and 
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The condition (SB-1) says that, from period 2 on, the consumption in each period should 
be equal for each work-state N or U, which is also required for the first-best. The 
condition (SB-2), however, states that per period consumption for those with work-state 
U should be less than that for those with work-state N. This is due to the moral hazard 
associated with a search incentive, and distinguishes the second-best from the first-best.     
 
 





To identify a set of savings, borrowings and UI taxes and benefit that generates the 
second-best consumption pattern for an individual, we will first figure out how those 
variables determine the consumption level in each period for each state. In this model the 
UI tax T is paid only in period 15, and the unemployment benefit B paid in period 2 
consists of the benefit r funded by UI tax T and the benefit R funded by lifetime savings. 
The benefit R is self-insurance for an unemployed worker, which can be financed either 
by his pre-unemployment private savings or by borrowings from his future pension 
savings. The distinction between these two is important in this paper, for reasons which 
will be discussed later.  
The condition (SB-1) for consumption smoothing implies that the savings of an 
individual with a given work-state should be the same for all periods, because in this 
model a worker faces the same wage for each period while there is no discounting. Let 
uss ,1 , and ns  be the savings rate in period 1, the savings rate for those with work-state U 
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  Let },,;,,{ ******1 TRrsss un  be a set of the optimal variables that can achieve the second-




solve for these variables by maximizing V(.) subject to the individual search behavior 
constraint (3) and the government budget constraint. More specifically, the variables 
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subject to 
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      rqT = .                                                        (Government Budget Constraint)       (7)                                   
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The valuation functions I(.) and J(.) measure the payoff as of  period 2, depending on 
whether the individual is or is not employed  in period 2, respectively.  For the purpose of 




Before characterizing the second-best optimum, we will briefly outline the underlying 
intuitions. In determining the second-best savings, borrowings and UI benefit, the 
consumption smoothing across periods or across work states is critical. The maximization 
problems (8) and (9) suggest that the optimal savings and borrowings },,{ *** Rss un are to 
be set solely based upon intertemporal consumption smoothing for those in a given work 
state N or U. The optimal savings s1* in period 1 and the optimal UI benefit r* (and its tax 
T*) are also affected by consumption smoothing across periods and across work states, 
respectively. As for s1* and r*, however, another consideration may also apply. Although 
an individual takes UI tax T as given in choosing his search strategy as implied by (6), T  
depends upon the unemployment probability q , which is in turn affected by an 
individual search decision. In determining s1* and r*, therefore, we have to take into 
account their effects upon T. In other words, s1* and r* will be set  to facilitate  
consumption smoothing across periods and work states, taking incentive effects into 
account. Differentiation of (6) with respect to r and s1 will provide us with the  following 




































 The proof of the Lemma can be found in the Appendix. Lemma (i) shows that an 
individual worker’s search decision is adversely affected by the tax-funded UI benefit r. 
This is the source of well-known welfare cost associated with the UI system.  Lemma  (ii) 
shows that the savings in period 1 would also negatively affect search effort decision, 
because a worker with greater private savings would not take as serious the reduction in 
his account balance. In other words, an individual search decision is negatively related to 
one’s post-unemployment lifetime consumption. To the extent that savings in period 1 is 
only a small portion of one’s post-unemployment lifetime consumption, therefore, its 
effect on e′ would also be minimal. In particular, we will assume that q is so small 
relative to M and N that  
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q .                                                                     (A) 
 
Under the assumption (A) the effect of  s1 upon UI tax T would become negligible, 

















∂  by (7). Since the assumption (A) enables us to ignore the search 
incentive effect of s1 in determining its optimal value, the optimal savings s1* in period 1 






Ma 2+≡  be the ratio of length of working career to retirement duration. Then,  
we can establish the following Proposition on the second-best set of savings, borrowings 
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Proposition 1 suggests that the second-best savings, borrowings and UI benefit can be 
characterized as a function of exogenous parameters, qNMH ,,,,δ . Here δ represents 
an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and H indicates search elasticity or the 
sensitiveness of reemployment probability to the increase in threshold search cost 'e .7 












in period 1 is determined as a retirement savings based on intertemporal consumption 
smoothing for given r*, not as a precautionary savings against unemployment risk. 
Without the government provision of pension-funded borrowing, however, the savings s1 
in period 1 would also have to serve as a precautionary savings against unemployment 
shock. This is the case for the conventional UI system, which will be discussed later. By 
(ii) and (iii) the optimal savings after period 1 are also to be determined solely by 
intertemporal consumption smoothing for given UI benefit r*. 
As for the second-best self-insurance R*  (using pension savings), it is also determined 
by intertemporal consumption smoothing as shown in (iv). Although the government 
provides an unemployed worker with tax-funded benefit r*, it may be  short of his optimal 
consumption level, due to the concern about search incentives. Given the limitation of the 
tax-funded benefit r* , an unemployed worker may rely on a certain amount R* of 
pension-funded self-insurance that supplements r*.8 
On the other hand, the optimal UI benefit is set by (v) to balance consumption 
smoothing between the two work states N and U,.,(which represents the provision of  
insurance) with the concern about incentives. The first term *Xδ of (v) reflects the 
marginal insurance benefit provided by r, while the second term *))(' HraU  represents its 
marginal incentive cost.  
Note that the marginal insurance benefit of r is positively related to X , the amount of 
consumption reduction per period due to unemployment. This implies that the risk 
burden that an individual has to bear due to the limitation of r depends upon the amount 
of consumption reduction per period, not upon the total consumption reduction. The 




unemployed individual would not be able to borrow, therefore, the risk burden of 
unemployment he has to bear would be positively related to (1-r). Under the integrated 
UI system in which an individual can borrow, however, he can spread out the reduction 
in lifetime income  over the working and retirement period. This reduces the risk burden 
associated with the incomplete provision of insurance against unemployment . This is 
how integrated UI system improves the trade-off between insurance and incentive,  
thereby enhancing welfare.  
Taking into account the fact that the optimal self-insurance R* and tax-funded UI 
benefit r* are partial substitutes for each other(by (iv) of Proposition 1), the relatively 
small marginal insurance benefit of r under the integrated UI  suggests a smaller tax-
funded UI benefit under the integrated system.  Some of the tax-funded UI benefit is 
replaced by self-insurance .  A complete set of comparative statics about the  mix of self-
insurance and tax-financed insurance is presented in the following Proposition.  
 
Proposition 2 











































  The proof of Proposition 2 is included in the Appendix. As the search elasticity 
(indicated by H) increases, the potential incentive cost of unemployment insurance grows, 
making it more desirable to rely on pension funded self-insurance; but the fact that 
insurance is more distortionary means that, in addition, the total unemployment benefit 
(tax funded plus pension funded self-insurance) decreases.  Greater risk-aversion of a 
worker (a higher δ) implies a  greater need for insurance against the risk of 
unemployment, as well as greater reliance on  tax-financed benefits more than pension-
funded self-insurance. 
  Consider some extreme cases. When a worker is risk-neutral, i.e., when δ = 0, 0* =r : 
there is no need for unemployment insurance. Note from Proposition 1 (iii) that 
** 1 usR −=  in this case, which implies that the pension-funded self-insurance R takes 
care of all the necessary consumption smoothing for those with the work-state U.  
Reliance on pension-funded self-insurance is also desirable when the reemployment 
probability of a worker is very sensitive to his search effort, i.e., when H is very large.  
On the other hand, if a worker is very risk-averse ( δ is very large) or if his 
reemployment probability is constant irrespective of his search effort ( H = 0),  no 
pension-funded self-insurance will be necessary. In this case, 1* =r  by Proposition 1 (v), 
implying that after receiving the tax-funded benefit, which provides complete insurance 
so that it is equal to the wage the individual would have received had he been employed9, 
an unemployed worker saves some of the benefit so as to smooth out his consumption 
over time.  
More importantly,  Proposition 2 (iii) shows how the optimal benefit package for the 




M and N with a kept constant indicates that the  unemployment duration gets shorter 
relative to the length of working life. Under this circumstance the optimal benefit 
package for the unemployed entails a larger amount of pension-funded borrowing and a 
smaller amount of tax-funded benefit. The reason for this result is that the risk associated 
with unemployment viewed from a life-time perspective gets smaller, so that when it can 
be effectively smoothed as under the integrated UI system, the risk burden becomes 
negligible. That is, a worker who borrows from his pension can ease the burden of 
reduction in his lifetime income by spreading it out more effectively over the longer post-
unemployment and retirement periods, i.e., by increasing his savings during the post-
unemployment period and reducing his consumption during retirement. 
 
 
II.2.  Government Intervention for the Second-Best Outcome 
         : The Integrated UI System 
 
II.2.1. The Relevance of Integration 
In this subsection we will see whether or not we need government intervention to 
support the second-best optimum we have described. There are two possible reasons for 
government intervention: first, all the second-best variables may not be decentralized by 
individual choices in competitive markets; and second, the second-best outcome may not 





Let us first look at the decentralization issue, assuming for the moment that the capital 
market is perfect.  It is easy to verify that  the second-best UI benefit *r can be supported 
as an equilibrium in a competitive insurance market. Since the government budget 
condition (7) is equivalent to the zero profit condition for an individual insurance firm, 
the maximization problem for r* will be identical to the one for an equilibrium amount of 
insurance in a competitive market.10  
In examining whether or not the other second-best variables – savings },,{ ***1 un sss and 
borrowings rate *R - can be decentralized by individual choices in a competitive capital 





i Rsss  be an individual’s choices of 
savings and borrowings rates given },{ ** Tr . An individual makes these choices by 
maximizing his expected utility (5) without the budget constraint (7) or without taking 
into account the effect of his search incentive on the UI tax (or premium) T.  However, 
the equations (8) and (9) imply that both individual and second-best optimization 
problems for Rss un ,, are the same, i.e., that if 
*
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As for s1i, on the other hand, it will be determined solely by intertemporal consumption 
smoothing because an individual takes T as given in choosing s1i. Since this turns out to 
be the case for the optimal savings s1* by the assumption (A), s1i  = s1*. Thus, we have 






Under the assumption (A), the second-best outcome can be decentralized by individual 
choices in competitive markets, i.e.,  
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Conversely, if assumption A is not satisfied, individuals in making their own savings 
decisions the first period fail to take into account the moral hazard effect associated with 
that savings. Hence,  the greater the savings, the less the search intensity should they be 
unemployed, and accordingly the greater the burden on the unemployment insurance 
system.  This is a standard externality-like effect that arises in insurance markets.  In this 
case, it takes the somewhat surprising form that individuals will save too much.  In this 
particular model, the government might be able to control the level of savings (assuming 
it is observable) by taxing savings that exceed s1* at sufficiently high rates such that 
individuals will not save excessively.  But more generally, the government will have to 
intervene to obtain a third best outcome by taxing activities that are substitutes for search 
and first period consumption and subsidizing activities that are complements.  (See 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986, and Arnott and Stiglitz, 1990) For the analytical simplicity 
we will not pursue these issues by assuming (A) in this paper. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the government does not need to intervene  if capital 
markets are perfect, so that individuals can borrow against future income.11 But because 




individual has to borrow to sustain his optimal consumption. Suppose that the 
government sets the mandatory savings rate in period 1 to be *1sα , where ]1,0[∈α . The 
amount of withdrawal an unemployed worker can make in period 2 would then be 
*
1)1( sα− . Note that α would not affect any individual choice in this model so long as 
1≤α , because *1s is the level of savings that an individual wants to make in period 1. 
The amount of necessary borrowing for an unemployed individual will then be 
))1(( *1
* sR α−− . Thus, the integrated UI system will be needed to support the second-
best optimum if the amount of  borrowing required to sustain the second best optimum is 
positive, i.e., if 
   
 **1)1( Rs <−α .                                             (10) 
 
Condition (10) suggests that the integration of UI with a pension is likely to be relevant, 
or welfare enhancing12 , when (i) the optimal borrowing R* is large (which will be the 
case when the optimal tax-funded benefit r* is small), (ii) the pre-unemployment savings 
is small, or (iii) the level of mandatory savings (α) is high.   
  Under certain circumstances an unemployed worker would not need to borrow much 
for his consumption. If the optimal pension-funded self-insurance R* is small for the 
reasons presented above, for example, then the amount that an unemployed worker can 
withdraw *1)1( sα− may be large enough to cover R*. In this case, the integration of UI 
with a pension would not be necessary. Furthermore, if the tax-funded benefit r* is very 




tax-funded benefit r*, in which case an integrated UI system would again not be relevant. 
However, we can present a certain set of parameter values for which integrated UI is 
always relevant.  More specifically, Proposition 1, 2 and the condition (10) can give us 
some important results on the conditions for the relevance of integrated UI system. First, 
we can establish the following. 
 
Proposition 4-1 
For any given set of exogenous parameters },,,,{ NHq δα , there exists M (< ∞) such 
that (10) holds if ),,,,( NHqMMM δα=> . 
 
 
The proof is delegated to the Appendix. Proposition 4-1 demonstrates that an integrated 
UI system is desirable if  M  (the post-unemployment working period) is long enough.   
The reason for this should be obvious:  With a long working period (given a fixed 
retirement period), the savings rate required to finance retirement is lower.13  Also, long  
working period tends to render small the risk burden of self-insurance R, leading to more 
self-insurance and less tax-funded benefit (by Proposition 3 (iii)). The reduction in s1* 
and the increase in R* imply the greater need for the integrated UI by (10). Note that 
integrated UI is relevant for large M because s1* → 0 while R* > 0 as M goes to infinity. 
  To examine other conditions for the relevance of the integrated UI, we will keep the 
ratio of employment duration to retirement duration, )2(
N




suppose that 1≥a . Then, we can establish the following Proposition on the relevance of 
integrating UI with the pension program.  
 
Proposition 4-2 
Suppose that 1≥a  and that a  is kept constant. There exists a set of finite parameter 
values },,{ ooo HM δ  for any given set of the other parameter values such that (10) holds 
if  
  (i) ),,,,( aHqMMM o δα=≥ , 
  (ii) ),,,,( aMqHHH o δα=>  ,  
  (iii) ),,,,( aHMqo αδδδ =< . 
 
  
 The proof can be found in the Appendix. The result (i) shows that another feature of an 
individual career structure – the relative length of unemployment period - may also affect 
the relevance for an integrated UI. As both working and retirement periods get longer 
relative to unemployment duration, the pre-unemployment savings s1* increases just a 
little due to the slight reduction in UI tax T (by Proposition 1 (i) and (v)) while the 
pension-funded self-insurance R* increases (by Proposition 2 (iii)). Since the increase in 
R* outweighs  the increase in s1*, for large enough M (and N) integration becomes 
unambiguously desirable. This result can be seen another way:  (10) will hold for large M 










  Proposition 4-2 also shows that the integration of UI with a pension program would be 
necessary when workers are not so risk-averse and reemployment is relatively sensitive to 
search activity. When the economy is subject to serious incentive distortion, the tax-
funded benefit decreases (by Proposition 1 (v)) and thus the need for borrowing grows 
(by Proposition 1 (iv)). The integration is necessary for large H because as H goes to 
infinity, all the consumption for the unemployed will be financed by self-insurance R (by 
Proposition 1 (iv) and (v)), which is greater than s1. If H = 0, i.e., if there is no incentive 
problem, there would be no need for pension-funded self-insurance, so that no integration 
might be necessary. If workers were risk-neutral, on the other hand, there would be no 
need for tax-funded benefits (by Proposition 1 (v)), implying the need for full integration. 
As workers become more risk-averse, however, the optimal tax-funded benefit would rise 
and thus need for integration would be reduced.  
 
II.2.2. Mandatory Savings 
 It is obvious that the greater the level of mandatory savings, the greater the desirability 
of integration. More specifically, we can state the following Proposition, with its proof 



















As α approaches unity (all of first period savings are mandatory) then integration is 
always desirable so long as in the second best optimum, there is some pension-funded 
self-insurance, which there will be so long as individuals are not very risk averse and/or 
there is no moral hazard problem associated with search. This suggests that an economy 
with a strong public pension program should integrate unemployment insurance with the 
pension program. 
In improving welfare relative to the conventional unemployment insurance,there might 
seem to be an alternative to integrating the public pension program with the 
unemployment insurance scheme: reducing α to zero or eliminating the public pension 
program.  This is not the occasion to provide a full rationale for the existence of such 
programs.  Our analysis is simply predicated on the observation that governments have 
chosen to provide such programs; if they do so, then our analysis has demonstrated that 
the unemployment insurance scheme should be integrated with it.  But our analysis goes 
further:  as we shall show in the next section, a program integrating unemployment 
insurance and pensions increases welfare relative to a purely private (non-mandatory) 
pension scheme, with imperfect capital markets, because it allows, in effect, for 
borrowing against future income. 
 While we do not provide here an analysis of the role of mandatory pension 
programs, we note that there are a number of factors which may make such schemes 
more or less attractive.  For instance, societies in which there is more concern that elderly 
individuals do not fall below a certain threshold level—but in which at the same time 
there are many individuals willing to take advantage of society’s compassion—will find 




unemployment is particularly high among those with low income—for whom the 
mandatory savings constitute a large fraction of their total savings—then integration will 
be desirable.  In the United States, for instance, those at the bottom of the income 
distribution have little savings to which they can get access, and at the same time face 
higher risks of unemployment.  Similarly, integration is likely to be of particular value in 
developing countries, where monitoring informal work may be difficult (so designing 
unemployment insurance schemes is more problematic) and where the poor both face 
high risks of unemployment and have low savings.   
 
II.3. Welfare Performance of the Integrated UI 
II.3.1. Comparison Between the Conventional UI and Integrated UI 
 We have stressed that the welfare advantage of an integrated UI system over the usual 
UI system arises from capital market imperfections. Without the government provision of 
pension-funded borrowings, when (10) holds, an unemployed worker would not only 
have to use savings made in period 1 in an effort to maintain the optimal consumption 
level, but he would have to undertake  some additional (precautionary) savings in period 
1 to supplement the tax-funded benefit r for his consumption while unemployed.  
To present a clear comparison between the conventional UI system and the integrated 
system, we will assume that no mandatory savings is prescribed by the government, i.e., 
that α = 0. Suppose also that (10) holds, i.e., **1 Rs <  so that  integration is necessary for 
the second-best optimum. Then, we can show that the consumption level of an 
unemployed worker under the conventional UI system in the periods prior to the 




integrated  system. Let  rˆ  be the (tax-funded) UI benefit paid by the conventional UI 
system, and let 1sˆ  be the savings that an individual makes in period 1 under UI. Then we 
can prove the following results. 
 
Proposition 5 
Suppose that α = 0 and that **1 Rs < .  Then, 
 
(i)    rr ˆ* < , 1* sˆR > , 
(ii)   1
** ˆˆ srRr +>+ . 
 
 
  The proof of the Proposition 5 is delegated to the Appendix. The Proposition confirms 
the earlier intuition:   Under the conventional UI system, if a worker’s optimal retirement 
savings s1* in period 1 is not enough to replace the optimal pension-funded benefit R*, he 
would have to make additional savings in period 1 to ameliorate the consequences of the  
unemployment shock. Since this precautionary savings involves some efficiency costs, 
however, the savings made in period 1 would still be  short of the optimal self-insurance 
R* for the unemployed. Although the tax-funded benefit will increase to partially fill  the 
gap, because of the costs associated with the distortion, it would be insufficient to secure 
the optimal consumption for the unemployed. 
 
II.3.2. Welfare Performance of the Integrated UI:  




The welfare advantage of the integrated UI system stems from its ability to ease the risk 
burden caused by the insufficiency of (optimal)  UI benefits by spreading out income loss 
over one’s lifetime.  In this subsection we will explore how much the integrated UI 
system can improve welfare. In particular, we will show that  where the post-
unemployment working period (M) or the retirement duration (N) is very long, the 
integrated UI system can approximate the first-best optimum. 
 The condition (6) for the threshold search cost can be rewritten as  
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The payoff for a worker then under the optimal system ),( ** Rr , denoted by V*, would be 
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2'   and qC ˆ,ˆ  are defined as in (FB-1) and (FB-2), respectively .  
Then, we can now establish the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 6 
   As M → ∞ while a
N













aC +=+= }, can be approximated by the integrated UI system ),(
** Rr . 
   
 
The proof of Proposition 6 can be found in the Appendix. It highlights one of the 
several important aspects of an integrated UI system. As the period of post-
unemployment or retirement gets longer compared to the unemployment period, the 
integrated UI system makes arbitrarily small the amount of welfare distortion associated 
with pension-funded borrowings.  This occurs because under the system the adverse risk 
effect becomes arbitrarily  small, while maintaining the desired level of search incentives. 
In the limiting case, the pension-funded self-insurance would have no risk effect with no 




pension-funded self-insurance.   Full integration thus allows the achievement of  the first-
best optimum.  
As previously noted, if 1≥a , then the integrated UI system will be relevant in 
approximating the first-best optimum. If 1<a , however, the relevance of the integrated 
UI would depend upon the mandatory savings rate α. 
 
 
II. 4. Remarks  
II.4.1. Multiple Unemployment Shocks and Participation Incentives 
We have dealt with, up to now, a simple case where an individual experiences only one 
unemployment shock in his career. In fact, however, people may experience several 
unemployment shocks, which are to be covered by the integrated UI system. We will 
briefly mention the effectiveness and benefit structure of the integrated UI system under 
this circumstance. 
Replacing tax-funded benefit by pension-funded borrowing  would still alleviate 
incentive cost associated with tax-funded benefit while reducing risk burden associated 
with borrowing. The benefit of the integrated UI system  would be especially marked 
when the unemployment shocks occur earlier (rather than later) in one’s career.  Only if 
there is a risk of substantial correlation among the unemployment shocks, so there is a 
risk of substantial lifetime losses as a result of these shocks, do the benefits of integration 
become limited.  Proposition 2 argued that if the unemployment shock was small relative 
to lifetime income (and if the unemployment shock came early in life) then integration 




there is a risk that, in effect, the unemployment shock is large relative to lifetime, so that 
the gains from integration may be small.   
The question  then is whether or not total unemployment duration for an individual is 
short  compared to his lifetime, which can be explored empirically. Feldstein and Altman 
(1998) demonstrated in a simulation study based on PSID that if an individual deposits a 
modest amount out of his income to his savings account to finance his unemployment 
benefit (that under the current UI system), the terminal balance of an individual savings 
account is positive for most of individuals. Similar studies by Vodopivec and Yun (2002)  
on developing countries such as Malaysia and Estonia reveal that for most individuals the 
amount of hypothetical lifetime unemployment benefit for an individual is only a small 
portion of  lifetime savings .  These results seem to support the relevance of an integrated 
UI system.15  
Intertemporal consumption smoothing implies that the optimal amount of borrowing 
(from one’s pension) at a certain point in time is positively related to the level of his 
pension expected at that time. Thus, the integrated UI system may involve a different 
benefit mix for the unemployed depending upon their employment history. For an 
unemployed worker who has a relatively long period of unemployment experience and 
low level of expected pension savings in the future, for example, the amount of the 
desired borrowing (out of the pension program) will be small. These arguments suggest 
that the amount of borrowing offered to the unemployed by the integrated UI would 
decrease in the total duration of previous unemployment.  
Another issue related to the relevance of integrated UI system relates to individual 




participation incentive problem would be particularly prevalent among the young workers 
in the informal sector who are relatively more subject to unemployment risk than others 
and who have yet to accumulate  large pension savings.16 Once they have borrowed more 
than the entire balance in their individual accounts, they may desire to quit the system 
because of their repayment liabilities (if they are allowed to do so). This adverse 
incentive problem will clearly limit the amount of borrowing that the integrated UI can 
offer the unemployed in the informal sector. However, the concern about adverse effects 
on participation  would not change the desirability of integration;.  but instead changes 
the benefit mix offered by the system. In particular, it reinforces the argument given 
above that the optimal amount of borrowing for the young may be negatively related to 
the total duration of unemployment they have experienced. The detailed analysis 
regarding this issue will be left for future research. 
 
II.4.2. Myopic Behavior 
 
The integrated UI system enables an individual to self-insure himself against 
unemployment by using his pension and thereby maintaining his search incentive. The 
favorable incentive effect of self-insurance is thus based upon the presumption that an 
individual has the burden of repayment for the borrowing he makes during 
unemployment. Some may argue, however, that an individual worker is so myopic in 
reality that he may not act as if he has such  a repayment burden, even when he does.  In 
particular, especially for the young unemployed workers, the repayment of borrowing 




search of benefits financed through self-insurance is no different from that from 
government provided insurance. 
 For such individuals, search can only be affected by differences in income experienced 
in the short run; that is, only limitations on the total benefit (r + R) will induce search. 
  In practice, even myopic individuals can respond to changes in consumption in the 
near term induced by success or failure in obtaining a job.  Earlier, we noted that if an 
individual is not myopic, he will reduce his consumption (or increase his savings) after 
being reemployed in order to spread out the burden of borrowing, as indicated by the 
savings sn* and su* characterized in Proposition 1. This implies that a rational individual 
in fact would start to pay for his borrowings just after a period of unemployment.    
By the same account the government can mandate a myopic individual to save more for 
his retirement after experiencing unemployment.17 Thus our model suggests that the 
government can use this differential mandatory savings policy or experience-rated policy 
to help induce search.  With myopic behavior, the government might need to impose a 
greater burden for repayment earlier in an individual’s life in order to induce the second 
best level of search. 
The welfare analysis of economies with myopic individuals is complicated by the 
difficulty of ascertaining the appropriate valuation function.  Traditional economic 
analysis is concerned with individual’s expected utility over their entire life.  But with  
myopic individuals, there is no loss to the individual’s expected utility (viewed at the 
beginning) to payments made out of retirement benefits to finance unemployment 





II.4.3. Distributional Issue 
 
It has often been argued that the integrated UI system with individual accounts 
aggravates inequality among individuals. High-wage workers, who tend to get 
unemployed less frequently than low-wage workers, are able to accumulate more savings 
than under the tax-funded UI system.18  In response to this argument, we can raise the 
following two points.  
First, there is another aspect of the integrated UI system that has a favorable 
implication for distribution. A key point of the integrated UI system is that it allows a 
worker to borrow against his future savings to finance a part of his unemployment benefit. 
This would be particularly beneficial to the low-wage workers who do not have much 
precautionary savings on their own against possible unemployment. Many studies have 
shown that income distribution among individuals at a particular point in time is more 
unequal than distribution of  lifetime incomes.19 This implies that a young low-wage 
worker, who has a higher probability of  becoming unemployed, has a high chance of 
moving up within the income strata of a society in the future. Thus it would be more 
beneficial to a low-wage worker than to a high-wage worker to use his future income to 
finance current consumption when he is  unemployed. 
Second, the government can provide an explicit subsidy to compensate for the implicit 
subsidy under the unintegrated system.  Appropriately designed explicit subsidies can 
mimic the distributional impacts of the implicit subsidies, and would entail no 





III. Toward a Joint Integration of Multiple Social Insurance Programs with    
    Pension:  An Integrated Lifetime Insurance 
  
We have argued that allowing a worker to withdraw from his pension to finance his 
consumption when faced with an unemployment shock can yield some welfare 
improvement. The idea of integration can be applied to other forms of social insurance 
than UI, such as health and disability insurance, that cover various shocks an individual 
may face in his life. We can then think of a comprehensive integration system that jointly 
integrates several social insurance programs with a pension program through an 
individual account.  We refer to this as  an integrated lifetime insurance system. If an 
individual experiences only a few shocks, so that the amount of corresponding income 
loss is small compared to his retirement savings, the previous argument for integration 
should still apply. Suppose, however, that an individual experiences so many of those 
shocks that were there heavy reliance on borrowing against future pension savings, his 
retirement account would be so drained that retirement consumption would fall below the 
socially acceptable level; there would have to be a government bailout.  Since early in his 
life, the individual does not know what shocks await him in the future, there would seem 
to be a risk associated with any integration. Given this possibility associated with multi-
risk case, we will in this subsection briefly examine the relevance of a joint integration of 
social insurances with pension.   
Before providing the more detailed arguments, we note that qualitatively there is an 
obvious answer to these concerns.  The degree of integration—of borrowing against 




insurance provided against risks later in an individual’s life depends on his cumulative 
experience.  An individual with no experience of unemployment early in life will self-
insure against small health and disability risks later in life.   
In general, the integrated lifetime insurance system consists of several social insurance 
programs integrated with the public pension program,  providing an individual facing a 
particular  shock with tax-funded benefit and pension-funded borrowing. As in the 
integrated UI, the benefit mix for a particular shock would depend not only upon risk-
aversion and incentive of an individual but also upon the parameters affecting the pattern 
of consumption smoothing. An important factor determining the benefit mix (the 
magnitude of the pension-funded borrowing) of an integrated social insurance is the 
amount of pension savings that is expected to be available at the time of retirement. If an 
individual under shock expects to have a relatively large amount of pension savings at the 
time of retirement, he would be offered a benefit mix consisting of large borrowings and 
a small tax-funded benefit. 
There are a couple of reasons for the positive relationship between pension-funded 
borrowing offered by an integrated social insurance for an individual and his pension 
savings expected at the time of a shock. First, the greater amount of retirement savings 
for an individual implies that more borrowing is necessary for intertemporal consumption 
smoothing in the event of  a shock.  Second, lower expected pension savings for an 
individual implies a higher probability that the government bails him out to sustain a 
certain minimum level of retirement consumption. As the government bails out a low 
pension savings of an individual, the pension-funded borrowing to finance consumption 




individual would know that  his borrowing  to sustain his consumption might not be 
repaid as he experiences more  shocks in the future. In other words, the reason for 
reliance on pension-funded borrowing is to eliminate the adverse incentive effects of 
insurance; the possibility of a government bailout means that there is still some implicit 
insurance, and therefore there is still some adverse incentive effect. Note, however, that 
this adverse disincentive effect of borrowing is less severe than a tax-funded benefit to 
the extent that there is some probability that the borrowing is repaid.  
The expected pension savings available to an individual at the time of retirement 
depends upon the amount of income loss caused by the shocks he experiences and the 
amount of borrowing under the integrated social insurances. Hence, the desired amount 
of pension-funded borrowing offered by an integrated social insurance for an individual 
will also be determined by  two factors.20 First, the amount of borrowing for an individual 
under shock would be negatively related to the number and the sizes of other shocks that 
he has experienced in the past and is expected to go through in the future. If he has 
already experienced several shocks and borrowed substantially against his future pension, 
for example, he may not have been able to accumulate much savings for his retirement. 
This will lower his expected pension savings, implying that should he experience another 
shock, he should not rely much on pension-funded borrowing. If shocks are highly 
positively correlated with each other, the benefit mix of an integrated social insurance 
involves less self-insurance and more tax-funded benefits. Second, the level of 
integration for a particular social insurance program— the amount of pension-funded 
borrowing offered by an integrated social insurance against that particular risk—is 




social insurance programs. This is because a given amount of pension savings has to be 
shared for self-insurance against the shocks dealt with under several integrated social 
insurance programs.  
This suggests that as more social insurance programs are integrated with the pension 
program, the level of integration for each  will be lowered. This raises the question : 
Would it be relevant to integrate all the social insurance programs with the public pension 
scheme or to exclude some of them from the integration? The answer is that all the social 
insurances should be jointly integrated  unless one risk is perfectly, positively correlated 
with another. With the risks being imperfectly correlated to each other, there is always 
some positive probability that an individual suffering from a shock later in his life has not 
experienced any other shock before, in which case some borrowing against his pension 
may be offered to him, and this will attenuate the adverse incentive effect of the tax-
funded insurance program...  
The basic idea behind the integrated lifetime insurance system is thus that there should 
be no constraint on the fund that confines its use to a specific set of shocks only. Such a 
constraint unambiguously lowers welfare.  The joint integration allows us to have a 
common pool of pension savings that we can draw upon  in funding benefit payments 
under different shocks. For those who have not experienced any shock and thus have not 
received benefits, for example, the system allows a relatively large amount of their 
pension savings to be used for the upcoming shocks (and retirement). Also, more pension 
savings can be used to finance the borrowing against an early shock if other subsequent 
shocks are expected to occur with a low probability before retirement.  




depend upon the correlation among the risks. If all the risks were perfectly, negatively 
correlated to each other, the joint integration would be able to give us the maximum 
welfare benefit by setting the highest possible level of integration for each social 
insurance. As the risks are more positively correlated to each other, the level of 
integration for each social insurance program that can be set by the joint integration 
system would become lower. When all the risks are perfectly correlated with each other, 
there is no advantage of sharing a common pool of savings, and hence no advantage in  
integration. Unless the risks are perfectly positively correlated, however, the integrated 
lifetime insurance system will always bring some welfare gain.21 
These arguments for the integrated lifetime insurance system  lend support to the 
Provident Fund in Singapore, Malaysia, and recently in Hong Kong. The Provident Fund, 
to which individuals contribute a portion of their wage earnings, covers several risks, 
such as disability, medical, and retirement risks. It should be noted, however, that there is 
an important difference between the Provident Fund and the integrated lifetime insurance 
introduced here: while the integrated lifetime insurance allows an individual to withdraw 
more than what he has contributed, the Provident Fund limits the amount of individual 
withdrawal to what he has accumulated in his account.  Thus the levels of insurance and 
intertemporal consumption smoothing it can provide to individuals are considerably 
limited, compared to the integrated lifetime insurance system that allows them to access 







The failure of markets to provide adequate  insurance against certain risks has long been 
recognized. This, combined with the fact that social norms  do not allow individuals in 
their old age to suffer from insufficient income, even when their misfortune arises partly 
because they have chosen to save insufficiently, provides a rationale for a public, 
compulsory pension program.  This paper has developed a further advantage to the public, 
mandatory program; it allows for the collateralization of future wage income in a way 
which is not easily possible otherwise, thus allowing individuals to in effect self insure 
against a variety of risks. 
 This paper has addressed two related issues. The possibility of pension-funded self-
insurance does not eliminate the desirability of some tax-funded insurance, except under 
extreme circumstances.  We have identified the factors on which the optimal degree of 
pension-funded self-insurance depends. Our analysis is consistent with the suggestion in 
the introduction of a heavy reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. 
 When there are multiple risks (including the risk of multiple bouts of unemployment), 
again some reliance on pension-funded self-insurance is in general desirable, unless the 
risks are perfectly correlated. The integrated lifetime insurance system can always 
generate a welfare gain from allowing a common pool of pension savings to be shared to 
finance the benefits for those facing various shocks. The general principle naturally leads 
to the suggestion of a fully integrated lifetime insurance system through a joint individual 
account, an extension of the Provident Fund of Singapore and Malaysia,22 where major 
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Proof of Lemma 
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Thus, differentiating (6) with respect to r and s1, we get the desired results from (8) and (9). 
 
 
Proofs of propositions: 
 
<Proposition 1> 
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          (A3)                            
 
The condition (A3) leads to the result (iv) by the assumption (A). Substituting the result (iv) into (A1) and 
(A2), and using the assumption (A), we get the desired results (i) and (ii). Since *** 1 usRr −=+  by (9), 
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srMU  and using (A3) and the assumption (A), we can 
rewrite (A4) as the desired result (v). 
  
<Proposition 2> 











































Proposition 1 (iii). 
 













Proposition 1 (iii) and (v). Solving for *X  from Proposition 1 (v) and substituting it into (iii), we get the 









As M → ∞, R* → 1 by Proposition 1 (iii) and (v). Also, s1* → 0 by Proposition 1 (iv) because r* → 0 as M 
→ ∞. This implies that (10) holds for large M. When M = 0, on the other hand, R* < 0 and s1* > 0, implying 
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As M → ∞ with a  being kept constant, R* → 
a
a




 by Proposition 1 (iii) and (iv) 
because r* → 0 by Proposition 1 (v). Since 1>a , (10) will hold as M → ∞. When M = 0, (10) will not 
hold because R* < 0 and s1* > 0. 
 



































































 while s1* → 2++ MN
N
 by Proposition 1 (iii) and (iv) 
because r* → 0 by Proposition 1 (v). Thus (10) will hold as H → ∞ (or as δ → 0). Similarly, as H → 0 (or 
as δ → ∞), R* → 0 while s1* → 2++ MN
N
, implying that (10) will not hold.  
 
<Proposition 4-3> 








, implying the desired results. 
<Proposition 5> 
Let s1(r) and R(r) satisfy 
 
















for any given r*. Also, let s1′(r) be the precautionary savings of a worker who is not offered any pension-
funded borrowing by the government.  Then, it satisfies 
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Note that 0))(( <Ω rR , because )()( 1 rsrR >  and by the above condition for s1(r). Thus, 
)()('1 rRrs < , implying the desired result (i). The optimal tax-funded benefit r′ for a given precautionary 
savings s1′ should satisfy 
 










, implying the desired result (ii). 
 
<Proposition 6> 
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1('(.)}(.){* =+→−=  as M → ∞ with a  being kept constant by (11),  qq ˆ→ . Then, 
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1 See Orzag, Orzag, Snower and Stiglitz (1999) for a more general discussion. Folster and Trofimov (1999)    
 also presented a theoretical analysis of individual savings account for social insurance. 
2 However, some detailed redistribution issues associated with the integration will be discussed later in this  
  paper. 
3 Since in our model, there are no adverse selection problems. 
4 There are some reasons, including a moral hazard problem, why the government has to mandate   
  individuals to make savings for pension. One of the reasons for a mandatory pension is that an individual  
 may not save for retirement because they may expect the government to bail him out when he does not   
 have savings at the time of retirement. 
5 Alternatively, we can model an individual as paying the  UI tax whenever he is employed rather than in  
 period 1 only. The difference in modeling would not affect the main results of this paper, however, so long  
 as an individual can maintain his optimal consumption in each period for a given state by adjusting his  
 savings or borrowings appropriately. 
6 This is also exactly the way an individual determines his savings s1, as will be shown later.  In the more  
 general case, savings in the first period does affect search intensity.  Assume, for instance, that the  
 individual lives only 6 periods, three work periods, three retirement periods, and faces unemployment in 
the second period.  If, for some reason, he had no savings from the first period, failing to search in the 
second would reduce consumption per period in retirement by 50%.  On the other hand, if he had been very 
risk averse, had anticipated that he might be unemployed, and that he might be unlucky and face a high 
search costs, and so had set aside 60% of his income (so that he has complete smoothing in the worse case 
scenario), then the benefit to searching—the cost of not searching—is much less, and so the threshold e 





7 H and δ are evaluated at the optimum.  Assuming that the risk aversion δ and search elasticity H are   
 assumed to be constant for all consumption levels and 'e , respectively, we can see that the second-order  
 condition for r* is satisfied.   
8 Theoretically R* could be negative as r* becomes greater than one’s optimal consumption level in period 2,  
 in which case a part of the tax-funded benefit has to be left for retirement consumption. Although this can  
 be perceived as another type of integration between UI and pension, we will disregard this possibility in  
 this paper. 
9 Remember that the wage has been normalized at unity. 
10 Note that all the individuals are of the same risk type in this model, so that insurance firms are not  
 subject to adverse selection problems caused by privately-informed individual heterogeneity. Once we  
 allow for individual heterogeneity, then the second-best UI benefit r* for all types of individuals would not  
 be supported as a competitive equilibrium. 
11 There are, of course, other reasons that government intervention might be desirable.  We focus here on  
 problems of moral hazard.  All insurance markets also face problems of adverse selection.  In general, such  
 markets are not constrained Pareto efficient.  See Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] and Arnott, Greenwald,  
 and Stiglitz [1994] 
12 This is because the second best optimum cannot be sustained without such integration. 
13 From Proposition 1 (i), the level of savings prior to the unemployment, s1 is lowered. 
14 For a more extensive discussion of the role of government in risk bearing, see Stiglitz [1992].  The fact  
 that mandatory pension savings cannot be withdrawn until retirement means that there is a considerable  
 welfare burden placed upon individuals who may experience several shocks other than unemployment  
 during their lifetime.  These concerns may have placed some limits on the extent of mandatory savings.   
 Integration may, accordingly, lead to still further welfare benefits (beyond those formally modeled in this  
 paper:  integration allows an increase in the level of mandatory savings, and thus an improvement in the  
 quality of the safety net provided to the elderly.    
15 See also Folster (2000) for a simulation study on this issue based on Swedish data. 
16 A worker in the informal sector can effectively drop out of participation by not reporting income.  This   




 induce individuals to move from the formal to the informal sector; there may be large costs associated with  
 this distortion. 
17 In fact, our model already incorporates this type of mandatory savings: an individual is mandated to save  
 the optimal level su* after experiencing unemployment, which is greater than the optimal savings level sn*  
 for those with no unemployment experience in period 2. 
18 In fact, in experience rated systems described before, the extent of redistribution through the UI system is  
 limited. 
19 See Bjorklund (1993) and OECD (1996). 
20 This implies that the benefit mix offered by an integrated social insurance for an individual would also  
 depend upon individual employment history as well as the nature of a shock he suffers from.   
21 There are some studies which indirectly suggest that shocks are not highly correlated for an individual  
 during his lifetime: Bjorklund (1993) showed based upon Swedish data that lifetime income is more  
 equally distributed among individuals than annual income. OECD (1996) also reported that the upward  
 income mobility for low income individuals is higher than for high income individuals. 
22 For detailed information on the system, see Asher (1994). 
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Footnotes 
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1 See Orzag, Orzag, Snower and Stiglitz (1999) for a more general discussion. Folster and Trofimov (1999) also presented a theoretical analysis of individual 
savings account for social insurance. 
 
2 However, some detailed redistribution issues associated with the integration will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
3 Since in our model, there are no adverse selection problems. 
 
4 There are some reasons, including a moral hazard problem, why the government has to mandate individuals to make savings for pension. One of the reasons for 
a mandatory pension is that an individual may not save for retirement because they may expect the government to bail him out when he does not have savings at 
the time of retirement. 
 
5 Alternatively, we can model an individual as paying the  UI tax whenever he is employed rather than in period 1 only. The difference in modeling would not 
affect the main results of this paper, however, so long as an individual can maintain his optimal consumption in each period for a given state by adjusting his 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
6 This is also exactly the way an individual determines his savings s1, as will be shown later.  In the more general case, savings in the first period does affect 
search intensity.  Assume, for instance, that the individual lives only 6 periods, three work periods, three retirement periods, and faces unemployment in the 
second period.  If, for some reason, he had no savings from the first period, failing to search in the second would reduce consumption per period in retirement by 
50%.  On the other hand, if he had been very risk averse, had anticipated that he might be unemployed, and that he might be unlucky and face a high search costs, 
and so had set aside 60% of his income (so that he has complete smoothing in the worse case scenario), then the benefit to searching—the cost of not searching—
is much less, and so the threshold e above which the individual does not search is much lower.   
 
7 H and δ are evaluated at the optimum.  Assuming that the risk aversion δ and search elasticity H are assumed to be constant for all consumption levels and 'e , 
respectively, we can see that the second-order condition for r* is satisfied.   
 
8 Theoretically R* could be negative as r* becomes greater than one’s optimal consumption level in period 2, in which case a part of the tax-funded benefit has to 
be left for retirement consumption. Although this can be perceived as another type of integration between UI and pension, we will disregard this possibility in 
this paper. 
 





                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
10 Note that all the individuals are of the same risk type in this model, so that insurance firms are not subject to adverse selection problems caused by privately-
informed individual heterogeneity. Once we allow for individual heterogeneity, then the second-best UI benefit r* for all types of individuals would not be 
supported as a competitive equilibrium. 
 
11 There are, of course, other reasons that government intervention might be desirable.  We focus here on problems of moral hazard.  All insurance markets also 
face problems of adverse selection.  In general, such markets are not constrained Pareto efficient.  See Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] and Arnott, Greenwald, and 
Stiglitz [1994] 
 
12 This is because the second best optimum cannot be sustained without such integration. 
 
13 From Proposition 1 (i), the level of savings prior to the unemployment, s1 is lowered. 
 
14 For a more extensive discussion of the role of government in risk bearing, see Stiglitz [1992].  The fact that mandatory pension savings cannot be withdrawn 
until retirement means that there is a considerable welfare burden placed upon individuals who may experience several shocks other than unemployment during 
their lifetime.  These concerns may have placed some limits on the extent of mandatory savings.  Integration may, accordingly, lead to still further welfare 
benefits (beyond those formally modeled in this paper:  integration allows an increase in the level of mandatory savings, and thus an improvement in the quality 
of the safety net provided to the elderly.    
 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
16 A worker in the informal sector can effectively drop out of participation by not reporting income.  This  is assumed not to be possible in the formal sector.  The 
concern is that the existence of large liabilities may induce individuals to move from the formal to the informal sector; there may be large costs associated with 
this distortion. 
 
17 In fact, our model already incorporates this type of mandatory savings: an individual is mandated to save the optimal level su* after experiencing 
unemployment, which is greater than the optimal savings level sn* for those with no unemployment experience in period 2. 
 
18 In fact, in experience rated systems described before, the extent of redistribution through the UI system is limited. 
 
19 See Bjorklund (1993) and OECD (1996). 
 
20 This implies that the benefit mix offered by an integrated social insurance for an individual would also depend upon individual employment history as well as 
the nature of a shock he suffers from.   
 
21 There are some studies which indirectly suggest that shocks are not highly correlated for an individual during his lifetime: Bjorklund (1993) showed based 
upon Swedish data that lifetime income is more equally distributed among individuals than annual income. OECD (1996) also reported that the upward income 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
22 For detailed information on the system, see Asher (1994). 
 
